SECURITISATION AND GENOCIDE:
Two chapters from work (two-volume book) in progress
It is mainly the second one which is of interest. The first is mainly included for reference.

BJØRN MØLLER
1 SECURITY, SECURITISATION AND R2P

The R2P principle entails a shift of emphasis from one form of security to another, i.e. a sacrifice of national security for the sake of human and societal, perhaps even environmental security. It therefore seems appropriate to commence with a brief overview of how “security” may be conceptualised.¹

1.1 Definition or Social Construction of “Security”?  
Considering that (national) security was arguably ever since the Second World War the central concern of International Relations (IR) scholars, especially those belonging to the dominant school of Realism, it is rather surprising how little was written about the concept of security as opposed to presumed strategies for achieving it. In his seminal work on Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define the term at all. The closest he came to a definition was that “National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions.” In another connection, he added “culture” to the list, emphasizing that the “survival of a political unit in its identity” constitutes “the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units.”²

Arnold Wolfers was thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which has therefore become more or less standard: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”³ This was not a bad definition at all, not least because it possesses the austerity and parsimony one should always demand from definitions. Rather than overloading or inflating a definition of a certain phenomenon with lists of its various subcategories or causes (as is often done) one should always keep a definition as short as possible, i.e. just elaborate enough to determine what should and should not count as an instance of the phenomenon in question. Wolfer’s definition does exactly this and leaves the task of classification and the determination of causality for later, e.g. questions such as whose values might be threatened; what these values might be, who might attack them and by which means, etc.

Whilst both Wolfers and other IR Realists during the Cold War, not without reason, placed the main emphasis on military threats from the Soviet Union, peace researchers tended to be uncomfortable with the exclusive focus on the military aspects of national security and for decades struggled to develop more meaningful comprehensive conceptions of peace, security and violence,⁴ also in order to avoid the ethnocentrism that arguably characterized IR as well as the related discipline of Strategic Studies.⁵ Both Johan Galtung’s term “positive peace” and Kenneth Boulding’s “stable peace” could thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of an emerging, expanded concept of security.⁶ For “security” to be genuine and durable, it would have to be a mere “negative peace,” in turn equated with an absence of war (representing merely one species of the genus “direct violence”). Rather, it should be based on a positive or stable peace structure, which would presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of what Galtung called “structural violence,” i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population. Thus conceived, a “positive peace” was
closely related to what is today referred to as “human security” (vide infra).

Belatedly, members of the IR community came to accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security.7 The first edition (from 1983) of Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear was thus the first elaborate theoretical analysis of the concept as such, in which the main focus was to add new “dimensions” (especially that of economics) to what remained national security, i.e. the security of the state.8 The author’s subsequent affiliation with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), and especially Ole Wæver, produced another expansion of the concept by providing scope for new “referents” of security besides the state, mainly stateless groups such as nations and ethnies entitled to “societal security” (vide infra). Both this expansion and the constructivist turn to which we shall now proceed have often been lumped together as the “Copenhagen School” in security studies.

Even more significant than the expansion was this school’s meta-theoretical revision of nothing less than the “ontological status” of security. Already early as 1983, Buzan had referred to “security” as what W.B. Gallie had labelled an “essentially contested concept,”9 for which the quest for a definition might be futile. Now the whole definitional endeavour was questioned from the vantage point of social constructivism, according to which there are no entities or phenomena “out there” in an objectively existing reality to which we may refer with terms such as “security” or “insecurity.” Rather, following up on Wolfer’s brief reference to “security in the subjective sense” in the definition above, they might be inter-subjective phenomena or social constructions, which only become constituted as (social) realities by being talked about.10

From this ontological vantage point a whole new research agenda would open up, where security studies should neither focus on estimating enemy military strength and devising scenarios on the basis of which strategies for meeting threats could be devised (as in mainstream strategic or security studies); nor challenging threat assessments and predominant strategies in order to come up with alternatives, as in certain strands of peace research. The main analytical task would be to study the discourses about security as “speech acts” (in the sense of John Austin) or Wittgensteinian “language games.”11 As argued by Ole Wæver security studies should thus focus on analysing evolving security discourses, i.e. to explore the “securitisation” and “desecuritisation” of issues.12

“Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics (…). “Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. (…) The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be found by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.13

In principle, anybody may try to securitise anything through a securitisation move, but whether this move will succeed depends on whether the audience accepts it or not.14 Certain issues lend themselves fairly easily to securitisation, e.g. because of their inherent scariness (as may be the case of terrorism), whereas it will
usually take more to create “fears of chickens” as entailed by a securitisation of avian flu; and it is usually
easier to securitise something concrete and tangible than abstract and/or immaterial matters. The social
status, “symbolic capital” and “habitus” (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu) of the securitising actor also
plays a role, as it is surely easier for a government, the editor of major newspaper or the director of a
television station than for ordinary citizens to securitise something simply because they are certain to be
heard. Moreover, the political dispensation of a country will also matters. While governments will tend to
find securitisation easier in non-democratic or even totalitarian polities than in democratic states, non-
governmental actors will benefit immensely from more liberal, pluralistic or “polyarchal” political
dispensations which at least allow them to voice their opinions which is a necessary, albeit far from
sufficient, precondition of being heard, in turn a sine qua non of persuading an audience which is what
securitisation is all about. Political culture may also matter, as a “deliberative democracy” in the sense of
Jürgen Habermas may be a more conducive setting for securitisation by non-state actors than a democracy
with a more authoritarian culture. As pointed out by Pericles (c. 495-429 BC) in his famous funeral oration,
“We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions; for
we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into
action before the consequences have been properly debated.”

The task of the researcher is to analyse processes of securitisation and the first step is obviously to
identify instances of attempted securitisation, which is not so much a matter of locating the word “security”
as one might do by means of a a Google search) as this term may or may not be used. Conversely, the term
“security” often pops up in other contexts than actual securitisation moves, e.g. when referring to the
“security-development nexus,” i.e. the infection of “good old-fashioned” development and/or aid strategies.
Indeed one will sometimes encounter the term “securitisation” (usually with pejorative connotations) as
referring to the inclusion of security concerns into any other strategy or policy—as when actors have their
own security as a hidden agenda when engaged in ostensibly altruistic activities—or to the “militarisation” of
issues that had better remain non-military. However, regardless of how controversial or objectionable such
ulterior motives or the involvement of the military in non-military matters may or may not be, neither of
these phenomena are not tantamount to securitisation in the sense of Wæver and consorts.

Rather, securitization research in their sense requires an identification within a body of discourse of
statements and claims which conform to the intrinsic logic or “grammar” of securitisation, which entails
claiming the issue to be of “existential” importance and extremely urgent. Unless solved without delay such
a problem may allegedly destroy all other values, which warrants assigning absolute first priority to it and
justifies a resort to extraordinary measures. What should count as extraordinary will depend on context. For
instance, whereas violating international obligations or using torture may be “business as usual” for some
states, for others such measures will constitute very dramatic departure from common practice. Certain
words would often be used in such securitisation attempts, e.g. “genocide” (often in the vague sense of “the
most heinous of all crimes”) or “emergency” as in “state of emergency,” which is often the legal framework used for extraordinary measures—which may explain the otherwise rather bizarre interest taken by securitisation theorists in the works of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), the classical theorist of states of emergency, according to whom “Not every extraordinary measure, not every police emergency measure or emergency decree, is necessarily an exception. What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order.”

A good starting point might thus be to google for such words or their synonyms. Having thus identified securitisation attempts the next steps include an analysis of the ensuing debate (if there is any) and its outcome, especially “the proof of the pudding,” i.e. whether a resort to extraordinary measures becomes (more or less) generally accepted. The conclusion will always be case-specific and tentative as there is no a priori reason to expect the same issues to be successfully securitised everywhere at the same time, nor that they will remain securitised indefinitely in the same country.

Even though securitisation theory is open-ended in the sense that anything may be securitised, this does not mean that anything should be. The fact that only one issue can have first priority should serve as a caveat against excessive securitisation of all kinds of issues. Moreover, even though having an issue which one cares deeply about (such as the environment or human rights) “elevated” to a security issue holds considerable attraction, the “extraordinary measures” that its successful securitisation might justify may be quite unfortunate. For instance, it may be abused by “the powers that be” to declare the issue “taboo” and/or used to marginalise their ideological opponents. A matter with alleged national security implications is arguably off limits, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject for political or academic debate, but one where everybody are obliged to “rally around the flag” and show loyalty to the common cause. This would speak in favour of a “desecuritisation” of pertinent issues with a view to providing scope for a more open and fruitful debates about them in the aforementioned spirit of Pericles.

Furthermore, certain strata in society or agencies within the state may benefit from securitisation, e.g. if they are traditionally viewed as being in charge of “security,” however defined. To securitise a problems may thus, for instance, offer the armed forces or other elements of the security sector a most welcome justification for their claim on national resources—inevitably at the expense of other sectors—which may not really be desirable. This is where what is often called “critical security studies” may have a central role to play as a supplement to securitisation studies. Based on Robert Cox’s often-quoted claim that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose,” they should devote themselves, inter alia, to uncovering the interests and power games underlying the security discourse and securitisation language games.

This would also be relevant for the securitisation of humanitarian concerns which is arguably implied by the R2P discourse, where mass atrocities or other humanitarian emergencies are securitised with a view to justifying bending or breaking the normal rules of state-to-state relations.
1.2 To Expand or Not (and How), That Is the Question

With these caveats in mind, we shall now proceed to briefly survey how “security” may actually be conceptualised and, if this is desirable, expanded beyond the narrow scope of traditional “national security” to also include what have been called societal, human and environmental security—and where R2P comes into the picture as a shift of emphasis from one form or species of the genus “security” to another. In principle, expansion can take place along different “axes,” i.e. as answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according to how radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy. Answers to these four question provides a classification matrix set out in Table 1.

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The first question is whose security we are interested in, i.e. the question of focus what Buzan & al. call “referent object,” whereas their critic, Bill McSweeney, prefers the term “subject”. Three types of entities immediately spring to mind which might be secure or insecure and whose survival or well-being might be securitised: the state, other human collectives or the individual. However, one might also use the environment, e.g. the global ecosystem or various endangered species, as the referent objects. The fact that this rarely happens may simply be due to the fact that all participants in the security discourse happen to belong to one of our planet’s thousands of species, i.e. that of *homo sapiens*.

The second question which arises is (following Wolfers’ aforementioned focus on threatened values) what values might be at stake. It stands to reason that the answer to this would depend on the choice of referent object. Only states have sovereignty and territories which may be endangered, whereas societal groups—e.g. defined in ethnic or religious terms—have other values that might be endangered such as identity. These values are not really relevant for human beings qua individuals for whom security is rather a matter of survival and quality of life, and as far as the environment is concerned, “sustainability” may be the
relevant value as we (as human beings) are not so much interested in the survival of the individual animal or plant as in their ability to propagate.

Third comes the question of the source of threats to these values. Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors, in addition to which there may be numerous “structural” threats (global warming, for example) without any agents. These might, in principle, also be securitised, but they rarely are. Finally there is the question of the form of threat, which may be both military (as in “traditional security”) or non-military, both of which categories lend themselves to further sub-divisions. As a prelude to the analysis in the following chapters we shall also relate this to possible R2P claims, which may in principle be related to any kind of security except perhaps national security, which is usually what any R2P operation will violate for the sake of other kinds of security.

What characterised the traditional IR approach to security was a focus on the state as the referent object of security, i.e. that entity which was allegedly insecure, but should be made secure. Even though the preferred term remains “national” security, this is actually a misnomer because nations (at least in the typical European terminology) are not the same as states. The state is an entity sui generis, often portrayed as endowed with almost metaphysical features or personified, i.e. treated as if it were an individual “writ large.” Neither the interests nor the will of the State are thus reducible to the sum of those of its citizens, but they are likewise sui generis. As we shall see at some length below, the rules of the game of the “Westphalian system” privilege existing states, regardless of their nature, and (at least formally) treat all states as sovereign, proscribing interference into their internal affairs, i.e. everything taking place within their territorially defined domaine reservé.

National (i.e. state) security in this sense is often equated by the incumbent regime with its own security, for the sake of which it often places that of its citizens in jeopardy, e.g. labelling even non-violent oppositional activities as threats to national security. Until quite recently such claims were rarely challenged, but whoever claimed to represent the state was internationally accepted as such, and it took quite dramatic events such as the wars in the Balkans and the Rwandan genocide to break this habit, leading to the R2P debate (vide infra).

In the early 1990s, the aforementioned Copenhagen School began advocating an expansion of the range of referents objects of security to include other human collectives than states such as stateless nations, ethnic or religious groups. The suggested label for such security was “societal security” which in the seminal work on the topic was defined as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats,” i.e. “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.” Societal security is thus a matter of identity which has indeed become quite a fashionable topic in IR theory. Some have, for instance, argued that even states face identity problems, for which they have coined the term “ontological security.”
Among the phenomena being discursively constructed as societal security threats have been international migration as well as its warped mirror images, i.e. extreme nationalism or xenophobia. If one group sees the very existence and identity of another group as a threat and acts accordingly, what some have called the “societal security dilemma” may be activated, where one group’s security is sought at the expense of the other’s insecurity. If such a securitisation attempt is successful it may “justify” resorting to such extraordinary measures as massacres against the opposing group or even ethnic cleansing or genocide, i.e. exactly the kind of emergencies which have given rise to the R2P debate. Appeals to fear of Tutsi domination thus played quite a significant role in recruitment for the Interahamwe militia and in the mental preparations for the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Even more than societal security, however, R2P has been linked to “human security,” a term coined by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1993 and 1994 Human Development Reports, as the following quotes will show. In the 1993 report it was argued that “The concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security.” This message was elaborated in the next report with the formulation that, For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime—these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (...) Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ—hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations—but these threats are real and growing. (...) Most people instinctively understand what security means. It means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment.

An often-encountered formula of human security is “freedom from fear and freedom from want” which is in fact a quote from US president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (1882-1945) famous “Four Freedoms Speech” from 6 January 1941. In this very broad definition, human security seems to correspond quite closely to the “human development” which UNDP measures on an annual basis with its human development indexes, or with human rights, especially if they are conceptualised somewhat broader than the West tends to do (i.e. primarily as civic liberties) to also encompass social and economic rights, as usually preferred by the Third World and as codified in the human rights conventions of the seventies. Even though the state was arguably created as a means to protect its citizens, history has clearly shown that it often fails to do so and sometimes even does the opposite, constituting a threat to their human security, as we shall see below. It is especially in such cases, where a state (represented by a government) blatantly neglects its duties to protect that R2P is raised as an option.

The concept of “environmental security” may, rather confusingly, both refer to threat either of the three first referent objects related to the environment or to threats to the environment, or elements therein as such, some of which might be anthropogenic, i.e. caused by human activities. To the former category
would belong to national territories, collective and individual survival etc. stemming from, for instance, climate change, deforestation and the like, whereas the latter would include threats to the biosphere as such or to individual endangered species. Even though neither of these eventualities really feature very prominently in the R2P debate we shall nevertheless briefly refer to them in the following.

1.3 Summary

We have thus seen that “security” can have several meanings, depending on what the “referent object” may be, and that in principle everything can be securitised by everybody—even though some issues may lends themselves more easily to this and some actors are better positioned than other to convince their “audience” of the existential importance and extreme urgency of meeting the alleged threat, if need be by means of “extraordinary measures.” As humanitarian interventions are certainly extraordinary as are some of the less dramatic measures that will be lumped together as “R2P lite” in Chapter #, they will often be justified through a securitisation move, i.e. with reference to either societal or human security issues. As we shall see in Chapter #, it is even conceivable that the environment may be securitised, even though this has not happened yet.

1 A good overview of the history of security studies is Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen: *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), passim.


29 A rather extreme example being Iraq under the Baath regime, where Saddam Hussein equated his and his party’s cause with that of the nation, “Arabism” and even Islam as such, as shown in Bengio, Ofa: *Saddam’s Word. The Political Discourse in Iraq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

2 “AS BAD AS IT GETS”: GENOCIDES

It stands to reason that R2P measures, even fully-fledged military interventions, will be easier to justify the more serious the problem is that they are intended to solve or mitigate, which is why genocides stand so central in the debate.

2.1 Securitisation and Genocide: What’s In a Word (or a Number)?

Even though, as we shall see below, the legal term “genocide” has quite a different meaning, the use of the term in ordinary language tends to signify the worst atrocities imaginable, bringing to mind either the gas chambers of the Holocaust or the ferocious killings by homicidal and sadistic Interahamwe militias of innocent civilians by means of machetes in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

Indeed, because of this superlative and nec plus ultra meaning of “as bad as it gets,” the very use of the term might be seen as an attempted “securitisation” of something in the sense mentioned in Chapter 1. It is almost impossible to accept that something is tantamount to a genocide without ipso facto acknowledging a political and moral, perhaps even legal, responsibility to do at least something even though, as we shall see below, the legal basis for this is more questionable. Labelling a calamity as genocide also makes it quite easy to justify a resort to extraordinary measures to prevent it or bring it to a halt and, conversely, harder to justify doing nothing. This logic may in fact help explain why the United States during the Rwandan genocide went out of its way to avoid using “the G-word,” because they were determined not to get involved.¹

This is, incidentally, not the only way in which securitisation and genocide may be linked. The instigators or perpetrators of genocides have also quite frequently used securitisation “speech acts” to present the intended victims of a genocide as mortal enemies and acute threats to their own group as a means to motivate the latter to participate in a genocide—as happened in Rwanda where recent and not all that distant events in neighbouring Burundi were used by Hutu extremist propagandists to “prove” the true nature of the Tutsis, thereby inflaming the envisaged perpetrators as well as bystanders to accept the need for a “preventive” and ipso facto defensive genocide, i.e. “killing them before they kill us.”² However bizarre it may sound, considering the minuscule Jewish share of world population, Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) and his ideologues also systematically referred to the Jews as a mortal enemy, who was to blame for starting the Second World War; hence the imperative to exterminate them. According to Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), the Führer in a secret speech on the 12th of December 1941 thus “prophesized” the impending annihilation of the Jews:

In regard to the Jewish question the Führer is determined to wipe the slate clean. He prophesized to the Jews that if they once more brought about a world war they would be annihilated. These were not mere words. The world war is here, the annihilation of the Jews must be its necessary consequence.³

Moreover, the denial of genocide may, paradoxically, also be securitised, in at least two different senses. First of all, those members of the perpetrator group who deny the need for a (“defensive”) genocide, e.g.
moderate Hutus in Rwanda, may be depicted as allies of the allegedly genocidal foe (in casu the Tutsi) who need to be killed in their capacity of political rather than ethnic enemies—as indeed they were. Secondly, and much more justifiably and innocently, those who deny that a past genocide such as the Holocaust ever took place such as the “bogus historian” David Irving (1938-), may be portrayed as threats to the nation’s (in casu Germany’s) “soul,” warranting repressive measures such as prison sentences—which is indeed (moderately) extraordinary measures in countries otherwise cherishing the freedom of expression. Even more surprising (because it had little, if anything, to do with France) was the French Parliament’s adoption in January 2012 of a law against denials of the Armenian genocide (to which we shall return in due course), which was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the country’s Constitutional Court.

Nobody in their right mind—a formulation which deliberately excludes the likes of former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (1956-)—would today deny that the Holocaust took place, but most other potential genocides in history are not nearly as well-documented, leaving considerable scope for diverging interpretations of whether or not they did amount to genocides and, if so, how severe they were. In this field the debate, even in academic circles can be quite venomous as some interpret the raising of questions about figures or documentation as equivalent to genocide/Holocaust denial. This, in turn, is often presented as an attempted exculpation of the perpetrators as if, say, a hypothetical downward revision of the estimate of Jewish deaths during the Holocaust from six to, for instance, five million would be tantamount to an exoneration of the Nazi regime. It becomes even more absurd when the estimates of genocide victims are based (as is very often the case) on a subtraction of ex post from ex ante population figures—as has been the case of the possible genocide of the American (and especially North American) genocides of the indigenous population. While it is true that one way of concealing a large-scale genocide would be to claim a low ex ante figure (as in “the territory was practically uninhabited to begin with”), it surely does not follow that higher ex ante figures are necessarily any more accurate than lower ones, much less that proponents of low estimates are “closet genocide deniers.” In all fairness there should be some neutral ground left for “statistical agnostics” who refuse to accept (what they regard as) wild estimates for the sake of “political correctness.”

Indeed, some authors uphold the view that the Holocaust was absolutely unique (or “uniquely unique”), thereby coming dangerously close to denying the reality of (or at least trivialising) other genocides, as a way of accumulating “moral capital”—a term derived from Bourdieu (1930-2002) as a sub-category of his “cultural capital”—but also inspired by Foucault (1926-84). The controversial author Ward Churchill (1947-) for instance, claims that

In attempting to (...) claim the status of an “unparalleled” victimization (“accumulating moral capital,” as exclusivist Edward Alexander has put it) proponents of uniqueness have engaged in holocaust denial on the grand scale, not only with respect to the Armenians, Ukrainians, and Cambodians, but as regards scores of other instances of genocide.

Here we encounter yet another paradox. Proponents of uniqueness, sometimes referred to as “exclusivists,”
have generally been hostile towards the emerging discipline (or at least academic endeavour) of comparative genocide studies, which they charge with trivialising the Holocaust. However, the only way to establish the uniqueness (or unique uniqueness) of the Holocaust is, of course, to compare it with other potential genocides—as has indeed been done (for a variety of reasons) in several comprehensive and book-length monographs and anthologies as well as in numerous works (typically articles) offering comparisons of a small number of (possible) genocides, typically two.

A possible compromise between the exclusivist and “inclusivist” positions might be to accept the Holocaust as the “paradigmatic,” “archetypal” or “prototypical genocide,” i.e. a Weberian ideal type of genocide which other genocides may resemble more or less in various ways—some perhaps in terms of intentions, others in terms of “accomplishments” and still others perhaps with regard to the methods employed. Even though Max Weber (1864-1920) held that such ideal types did not exist in reality, one might accept the Holocaust as a real-life manifestation of what Weber called a mental construct:

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild).

Finally, one needs to keep in mind that just as it is possible to deny a genocide for propagandistic purposes it is also possible to falsely accuse somebody (usually a state) of genocide, which may indeed be tempting because it constitutes such a strong admonition to “do something.” The renowned scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1946-) has thus made quite a convincing case that Darfur does not in fact constitute a genocide, both because those who claim that it is (including well-intended NGOs) have been “fiddling with the figures,” and because they misleadingly depict the whole conflict as a binary one pitting Arabs against Africans, whereas the reality is infinitely more complex. The ensuing debate about whether this conflict amounts (or, for a period, amounted) to a genocide or not has indeed not been particularly helpful in terms of solving or even mitigating the widespread and heinous atrocities which have unquestionably been committed in Darfur. It might thus have been preferable to avoid the term at all, focusing instead on what has actually been happening in terms of massacres and other instances of mass murder, rape, deportations and other atrocities, the cumulative consequences of which would certainly have sufficed as a justification for doing something.

2.2 What Is Genocide?

The last point is based on the assessment that the legal definition of genocide is not very fortunate and certainly differs radically from how the term tend to be used outside legal circles.

The term “genocide” was coined by the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), who began his academic quest for a proper term for what we today call genocide with a report on “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations” which was prepared
for an international legal conference in Madrid in 1933. In this report he defined “acts of barbarity,” including

[A]cts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.); for example massacres, pogroms, actions undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a collectivity, etc. Also belonging in this category are all sorts of brutalities which attack the dignity of the individual in cases where these acts of humiliation have their source in a campaign of extermination directed against the collectivity in which the victim is a member. 22

In his seminal work on *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* from 1944 he defined it as follows:

By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group (…) Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. 23

In an article published in 1946 Lemkin expanded the definition to encompass as potential victims of genocide “national, racial or religious groups.” 24 Besides thus offering a name with an accompanying definition, Lemkin also struggled with a very comprehensive comparative study of genocides which he was, unfortunately, never able to complete, but a couple of his manuscripts have been published posthumously, 25 and others have been referred to in the academic literature. 26

Lemkin was also working very hard to make the world adopt a convention outlawing genocide, 27 and by 1948 this endeavour came to fruition with the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG, or Genocide Convention for short). However, its definition was narrower than envisioned by Lemkin, counting as genocide only

(…) any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 28

We shall return to this wording shortly, but the adoption of a convention was still something. Having received the requisite number of ratifications, the convention entered into force in 1951, but the “genocide regime” of which it forms a central part (*vide infra*) is weakened by the fact that a number of states have attached reservations to their ratification. 29 This is, for instance, the case of India with its reservation that “for the submission of any dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each case.” The United States only ratified the convention in 1988, and with two reservations:

1. That with reference to article IX of the Convention, be fore any dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.
China is also special, as the convention was ratified by Taiwan as the recognised representative of China. After mainland China's taking the UN seat reserved for China, the government in Beijing declared this ratification “null and void,” to which it added, somewhat illogically, that “The People's Republic of China does not consider itself bound by article IX of the said Convention,” which would seem to imply that it does accept the rest of it. Still, as is apparent from Table # in Chapter #, a growing number of states have signed and duly ratified the convention even though several significant hold-outs remain such as Japan and Indonesia plus a number of African and other Third World states—but significantly not Rwanda which ratified the convention in 1975.

Besides the lack of universal endorsement, the convention also suffers from several internal weaknesses. First of all, “intent to destroy” may be hard to define and even more difficult to prove before a court of law. It has been convincingly argued that intent differs from motive as it is quite conceivable that genocidal acts may be committed intentionally, albeit merely as means to another end such as defeating an enemy. Proving this may, however, be difficult as political leaders and commanders often couch their commands in more opaque terms or simply let it be known what they want to have done without actually saying so expressis verbis or putting this on paper. In some cases, however (such as the infamous Wannsee Conference in January 1942 deciding on the Endlösung der Judenfrage, i.e. the “Final solution to the Jewish question”) those responsible kept meticulous records or their deliberations, which makes it fairly easy to prove their genocidal intent—even though the Nazis generally preferred euphemisms (such as “actions” or “deportations”) for their genocidal activities (vide infra). Even in this case, however, one cannot automatically assume (and much less prove) that each and everyone of their subordinates tasked with implementing the plan shared (or were even knowledgeable about) this intent.

Secondly, the phrase “destroy … as such” is problematic, especially when it comes to proving such an intent. For instance, even when the concrete culpability for intentionally killing all the residents in a village is demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt it may still be difficult to determine and/or prove in what capacity they were killed, which would be required for labelling it as genocide in the juridical sense. Whereas both of these formulation logically narrows the application of the term genocide beyond what seems reasonable, the terms “in whole or in part” points in the opposite direction as it does not specify how small a part this might be. Even an unsuccessful attempt at killing one per cent, or even less, of a group would thus warrant the application of the label genocide, which was surely never the intention. Indeed, even though the indigenous American tribe of the Mohican has in fact survived with around 3,500 members until the present day (as has that of the Mohegan with which it is often confused), the scenario described by James Fennimore Cooper (1789-1851) in his novel The Last of the Mohicans from 1826 of the killing just one person, the fictitious Chingachgook (or perhaps his son Uncas or the last female Mohican who might
have ensured pure-blood offspring) might constitute genocide if undertaken with a view to exterminating the tribe as such. In the words of Tamenund, “The pale-faced are masters of the earth, and the time of the redmen has not yet come again. (...) [B]efore the night has come, have I lived to see the last warrior of the wise race of the Mohicans.”

Thirdly, listing a number of acts entails the risk of leaving out what some might think considers being labelled as genocide. To its credit the convention does not limit itself to outlawing direct physical extermination, but also mentioning the creation of impossible living conditions. What it does not cover, however, it what has been called “cultural genocides” (vide infra). The wording of the convention has also been criticised for limiting the application to national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, thus excluding political, socio-economic and possible other groups that might also be victims of attempts to exterminate them as groups. We shall return to both these omissions in the next section.

It has been suggested to dispense completely with the term genocide and to talk instead of “mass atrocities” or “mass atrocity crimes,” subsuming genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity along with war crimes. One of the advocates thereof has been Gareth Evans (1944-), mainly because

For nearly all policymaking, political, and operational purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish between these categories and give apparent crimes particular labels. Worse, labelling can be counterproductive, particularly allegations of genocide, which can be very tempting rhetorically but—after lawyers have split legal hairs—can also give utterly unearned propaganda victories to those with heavy cases against them for war crimes or crimes against them.35

2.3 Sub-Categories of Genocide or Other “Cides”?

Even though genocides are, fortunately, rare occurrences which always exhibit special, perhaps even unique, features, comparative studies nevertheless show them to also have quite a lot in common. Some analysts have suggested adding other “cides” alongside genocide, inter alia in order to circumvent the above problems with the legal definition of genocide, but others have suggested relegating such cides to the status of sub-categories of a broader concept of genocide. Among the suggested “cides” are the following, most of which were listed either by Adam Jones (1963-) in his monumental introduction to genocide or the Dictionary of Genocide by Totten and Robert.36

The term “ethnocide” goes back to Lemkin himself who in a footnote in Axis Rule mentioned it as a possible synonym for genocide. It has also been used by several other authors, mainly, but not exclusively, to refer to genocides against indigenous peoples,37 for which another special term has also been suggested: “Indigenocide” which has also been suggested as referring to the attempted extermination of indigenous populations, mainly in connection with colonialism.38 The term “Judeocide” has been suggested by Arno Mayer as a special form of ethnocide, directed against Jews.39 Not only does this term seem utterly superfluous, but it also seems to invite a veritable avalanche of terms such as Armenianocide, Hererocide, Tutsicide, etc. to refer to other victim groups in history such as the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and
Turkey, the Hereros in German South-West Africa and the Tutsi in Rwanda. It seems preferable to reserve the term “Holocaust” (as well as the Hebrew equivalent Shoah) for the unique genocide perpetrated by the Nazi regime against the Jews, using the term “genocide” for the exterminatory killing of other groups such as the Romas (who also have their special name for this, i.e. the Porrajmos). It also seems less than helpful to use Holocaust as a generic term, i.e. as a synonym of genocide, as is sometimes done.

While there seems to be no particular need for a special “cide”-term for what is already referred to as genocide in the convention, as case can certainly be made for such terms to denote what was left out, e.g. mass slaughters with the intent to annihilate other groups. Michael Mann (1942-) thus proposes the rather inelegant term “classicide” for such events as the Stalinist attempted extermination of class enemies such as the Kulaks or that of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia against their “class enemies.” The rather bizarre term “poorcide” has also been proposed by an S.P. Udayakumar. Just as classes political groups also fall beyond the purview of the genocide treaty, which just might warrant the creation of a supplementary cide-term. The term “politicide,” suggested by Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, but also endorsed by Mann, referring to the killing of political opponents, usually especially the elite, for which phenomenon the term “eliticide” has also been suggested, which would capture cases of “elite decapitation.” This may include as victims former members of the same group as that of the perpetrators, as was the case of great purges ordered by Stalin (1878-1953) in the late 1930s of most of his former allies, for which Michael Mann proposed the term “fratricide.” Besides also being used for the simple killing of one’s brother (going back to Cain’s slaying of Abel in Genesis 4:8) it also seems superfluous as the simple term “political (mass) killing” seems to cover the phenomenon.

For more or less the same category of cases, but also applicable to genocide/ethnocide, i.e. the attempted extermination of the perpetrators’ own group the term “auto-genocide” has been proposed, e.g. by Ervin Staub (1938-), with the mass killings of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia of a mind-boggling number of their own ethnic kin arguably being the most extreme example. However, there is nothing to suggest that the regime of Pol Pot (1925-98) killed members of their own ethnic group, the Khmer, because of their ethnicity rather than because they were seen as political or class enemies (vide infra). The same applies to both Stalin and Mao Zedong (1893-1976) who also killed mainly their own national kin. The only historical case where the motive would seem to be the extermination of the perpetrators’ own ethnic group may be the bizarre case of the Xhosa cattle killings in 1856 to which we shall return in due course.

Quite a few scholars acknowledge a category of “cultural genocides” or “culturecides,” and some have even used this as a generic term for various species such as “linguicide” or “linguistic genocide” and “memoricide,” referring to the language and the historical memories which almost always play central roles in creating and maintaining the identity of a group. One might in fact conceptualise cultural genocide in terms of the “societal security” referred to in the chapter on security, simply defining cultural genocide as the most severe threat to a group’s societal security.
As religion is also an important element in both culture and collective identities, it should come as no surprise that attempts have been made both to exterminate peoples because of their religion and of exterminating their religion as such.\textsuperscript{52} Both might be called “religiocide,” even though nobody seems to have proposed this—which is actually somewhat surprising in view of the proliferation of “cides.” As we shall see below, the killing of people because of their religion was a prominent feature of the medieval crusades as well as of some of the various jihads proclaimed by Muslim rulers through the ages.\textsuperscript{53} However, the most blatant example of a genocide perpetrated by Muslims against Christians, the Armenian genocide of 1915-16, seems not to have been a genocidal jihad so much of a clash of two incompatible nationalisms, i.e. those of the “Young Turks” and the Armenians,\textsuperscript{54} as we shall see in the section devoted to this instance of genocide. Sometimes the two versions of religiocide are combined, e.g. if the victims are given a choice between being killed or abandoning their religion and converting to that of the oppressors or conquerors, as was the case for both Jews and Muslims in connection with the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula.\textsuperscript{55} A more recent example of a cultural genocide with elements of religiocide was the proclamation by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia about the predominantly Muslim Cham minority: “The Cham mentality (Cham nationality, the Cham language, Cham costume, Cham habits, Cham religion) are abolished. Those who do not abide by this order will reap all the consequences.”\textsuperscript{56} This decree was followed up with the burning of mosques and other Muslim institutions, and the Cham were forced to eat pork.\textsuperscript{57} Besides forced conversion of adults, religiocides have also been attempted by the forced transfer of children from Christian to Muslim families in order to ensure that they would grow up as Muslims, e.g. in connection with the Armenian genocide.\textsuperscript{58}

There can be no doubt that the destruction of a group’s culture is usually an important companion, and often precursor, of attempts to physically annihilate it as a group. It is also logically conceivable that essentially non-violent policies such as the closure of educational institutions or such cultural ones as museums or libraries (for which the term “libricide” has actually been suggested)\textsuperscript{59} may suffice for the eradication of a group as such, thus making the physical killing of its members superfluous. Whether this is actually possible or whether it has ever happened are empirical questions—but they beg the question whether to allow for “bloodless genocides” or exclusively “cultural genocides” which might risk devaluing the term genocide as such. It may be preferable to reserve the genocide term for bundles of policies seeking to eradicate groups which include the actual use of violence against civilians, and therefore either avoiding the term “cultural genocide” altogether or using it as a shorthand for cultural aspects of genocides.

As we shall see below, there are often gender aspects to genocides. Generally, men have been killed more frequently than women and children,\textsuperscript{60} who have quite often been spared deliberate slaughter whilst, needless to say, also suffering “collateral” killing. For those cases where they have not been, the term “root and branch” genocide has been suggested by Adam Jones and others, the inventor of the term apparently being the infamous Lord Jeffrey Amherst (1717-97) who recommended to extirpate the “vile and fickle
crew” of the North American Indians “root and branch.” There are nearly always gender aspects to genocides, for which phenomenon the term “gendercide” was first proposed by Mary Ann Warren (1946-2010) and then appropriated by Jones and others. Whether we really need such a term is surely debatable, if its merely intended to refer to the various gender aspect of genocide.

If there is more to it than this, e.g. if it is taken to mean the addition of gender to the groups included in the genocide convention, it would then seem to be a generic term for (at least) two “cides”, both of which do, however seem to be figments of the imagination, referring to exterminatory attempts directed against all men or women as such. “Androcide” might be an appropriate term for the specific killing of men as such (roughly synonymous with the term andropodismos to which we shall return below) but the category seems to be empty as there does not seem to have been any cases of attempts to exterminate men as such. The closest we get to this would be the killing of men as the presumed bearers of the “racial gene,” as the ones determining the class status of the nuclear family or the political elite, or as the most likely to become armed opponents—as may have been the case of the genocidal massacre on around 8,000 Bosnian men and boys in Srebrenica in July 1995. The closest one comes to pure androcide may in fact be the feminist activist group SCUM, i.e. the Society for Cutting Up Men, led by Valerie Solanas (1936-88), who is perhaps best known for her attempted murder in 1968 of pop-artist Andy Warhol (1928-87).

The female counterpart of androcide would be “femicide” (also known as feminicide or gynocide). The latter term—defined by Andrea Dworkin (1946-2005) as “the systematic crippling, raping and/or killing of women by men”—has, for instance, been applied to the widespread persecution of witches. There seem to be no historical instances of the intention to exterminate women as such which would of course be tantamount to an extinction of Homo Sapiens as a species. While SCUM in its Manifesto (written by Solanas) specifically mentioned the feasibility of reproduction without the aid of men as what made it conceivable to “destroy the male sex,” reproduction without women seems unlikely to ever become possible. By implication, femicide must mean something less than this in order to make any sense. Killing the female members of an ethnic group might, for instance, recommend itself as a means of preventing this group from propagating, and raping them (as has often happened in both wars and genocides) may be a means to the end of “contaminating the gene pool” of a group rather than simply a “reward” to the male troops or genocide perpetrators. Indeed, rape is now recognised in international law as one among several forms of genocide. In some cases, especially in “honour societies” the killing and/or raping of women may primarily be intended to humiliate the men.

While the male and female genders exhaust the concept of gender as traditionally conceived (with hermaphrodites as the very rare exception), one might, of course, also include sexual minorities such as transvestites, homosexuals or transsexuals as “genders” in their own right. In this case it might be tempting to coin additional “cide” terms for attempts at exterminating the “genders,” e.g. “transvesticide” or “homocide” (as opposed to homicide) or even the dreadful term “homocaust,” which has actually been
suggested. Considering that the Nazis also persecuted homosexuals as such, *inter alia* forcing concentration camp inmates to wear a pink triangle, and that widespread and vicious discrimination of gays and lesbians still takes place around the world a political case could surely be made for the latter, perhaps as a way of securitising the issue. This may in fact be the reason why some have charged decision-makers with genocidal neglect for not providing anti-retroviral treatment to AIDS-victims when the disease still mainly affected gay men. Whether it really helps scholarly analysis, however, is quite another matter.

The same is the case of the term “urbicide,” proposed by Marshall Berman (1940-), Martin Coward and others. There can be no denying that genocides have throughout history taken place in cities—just think of the fate of Melos and Carthage in Antiquity to which we shall return shortly, or of the virtual emptying of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975 (*vide infra*)—but most of these were surely not directed against the cities, but against their inhabitants, partly because they were believed to have been corrupted by their urban lifestyle. Besides killing the actual urban residents it may, of course, seem to make sense to destroy the city as such in order to prevent its repopulation—but even in this case, it is a matter of exterminating a special category of people rather than their residences. This would also seem to apply to the most extreme cases of destruction of cities, i.e. the nuclear attacks in August 1945 on the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the at least equally destructive allied aerial bombardments of Tokyo, Hamburg and Dresden during World War II, all of which were intended as stratagems to win the war—officially (as far as Hamburg and Tokyo were concerned) by destroying the war-making capabilities of the enemy, i.e. the German arms industry, but in reality perhaps with a view to maximising civilian casualties as advocated by the air power advocates such as Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) and Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956).

A similar equivocation is involved with regard to so-called “ecocide,” which may both refer to (cultural or other forms of) genocide by means of environmental manipulation and to the deliberate destruction of the environment—just as we saw in the chapter on security that “environmental security” was used both about threats to humans via the environment and to threats to individual species or to the local or global biosphere. We shall leave aside the latter in this connection (but return to it in the concluding chapter of this book) and now focus on the possibility of genocide via the environment. Keeping in mind that the Genocide Convention explicitly mentioned “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” there would seem to be a plethora of ways in which a group might be made to perish as a result of deliberately instigated environmental change. An obvious case was the draining of the marshes in southern Iraq by Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) which was, at least partly, motivated by his wish to destroy the Marsh Arabs as a group. The identities of groups may also be tied to certain ways or life which may in turn be linked with specific features of the environment or based on particular plant or animal species. Just think of the importance of the camel to Arab (at least Bedouin) identity or that of the reindeer to Saami identity; or consider the significance of the hunting of
bison to the identity of the native Americans of the great plains, or that of seal hunting for the Inuit people. By implication, it is conceivable that genocides of groups such as these might be perpetrated indirectly through the killing or extermination of camels, reindeer, bison or seals.

“Democide,” is a term apparently coined by the controversial scholar from Hawaii, Rudolph Rummel (1932-), who defines it as a generic term for genocide, “politicide” and mass murder, especially such as have been perpetrated by totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany and various communist states. Not only has he been criticised for his rather right-wing political views and ridiculed for having falsely claimed that he was short-listed for a Nobel Peace Prize, but his methodology has also been charged with several faults, flaws and biases, all intended to inflate the death tolls caused by Communist regimes. What he has usually done is to take the median between high and low estimates without much critical consideration of their reliability, but with an apparent “the higher the better” bias.

Even more all-encompassing is the term “omnicide,” inter alia suggested by the likewise controversial Norwegian/Hawaiian peace researcher Johan Galtung (1930-). It has mainly been used about the apocalyptic risk of an extinction of all life as the result of a nuclear conflagration, but might also be relevant for the similar effects of a climatic “melt-down.” Regardless of whether the latter would be anthropogenic or not, it does indeed seem likely that the Earth would be better off without the species of homo sapiens, in recognition whereof a rather bizarre movement has even emerged, calling itself the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT). Taking Neo-Malthusianism to the extreme, its stated goal is “May we live long and die out” and it is devoted to “phasing out the human race by voluntarily ceasing to breed.” Rather unsurprisingly, however, the VHEMT does not seem to have managed to enrol many members of this vilified species.

There are thus a lot of different terms and concepts competing with that of genocide, most of which do, however, seem rather superfluous. However important it may seem to highlight gender, cultural aspects etc. of genocide and mass killing, it seems preferable to label them as such rather than allowing for a confusing proliferation of “cide-” terms, as convincingly argued by Martin Shaw (1947-). It may also make sense to distinguish between the legal term and the everyday and scholarly terms, but the best way of doing this would seem to be specify (unless this is obvious from the context) whether one refers to one or the other. There may also be a need for a generic term for genocides and other events that do not quite meet all the criteria, perhaps likewise in a legal and a everyday/scholarly version. As far as the former is concerned, “crime against humanity” (to which we shall return later) would seem to be adequate, whereas other terms have been suggested for the latter usage. Jacques Semelin (1951-) has thus proposed the term “massacre,” but this seems too narrow, bringing to mind pogroms and certainly the killing of a lot of people at the same time whilst excluding the hunting down of victims. “Mass killing of non-combatants,” as suggested by Benjamin Valentino (1971), seems better even though it begs the question of numbers. To define “mass” as any number above 50,000 over at most five years, seems too blunt, simply because some states are much
bigger than others. The controversial Daniel Goldhagen (1959-) prefers the term “mass murder” to which he adds “eliminationism” which is actually not a bad definition.


4 The most prominent victim this category was the Prime Minister, Agate Uwilingiyimana, on whose fate see Melvern, Linda: A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 118-123.


In 2007 Churchill was thus fired from his post as tenured professor by the the University of Colorado (Rocky Mountain News, 25 July 2007) only to win an appeals case in 2009 (New York Times, 2 April 2009).


33 See the entry “Mohican” in Encyclopaedia Britannica at www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/358187/ Mohican.


44. For a very biased account see Rubinstein, Richard L.: *Jihad and Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), passim.


55. See, for instance, Hancock, Brenda Robinson: “Affirmation by Negation in the Women’s Liberation Movement,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, vol. 58, no. 3 (1972), pp. 264-271; Deem, Melissa D.: “From Bobbit to SCUM: Re-


73 There is a website by this name, www.homocaust.org/, devoted to the homosexual victims of the Holocaust. See also Lautmann, Rüdiger: “The Pink Triangle: Homosexuals as ‘Enemies of the State,’” in Michael Berenbaum & Abraham Foxman (eds.): *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Disputed and the Reexamined* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 345-357.


67 Shaw: op. cit. 2007 (note #), pp. 63-78.
